Introduction
As early as 1945, twenty two Arab nations had planned a common currency to be called the 'Arab Dinar'.
1 That idea however, did not take root. For several countries within MENA, exchange rate management has largely been a difficult experience. Their experience has generally been one of a fixed peg but incompatible macroeconomic policies causing exchange rate misalignment, serious overvaluation, capital flight, balance of payments problems and currency crises. More recently, most MENA countries have made considerable progress in liberalization of trade/financial systems and the adoption of pro market monetary policies.
These have ameliorated to some extent their perennial problems with exchange rates. Since the introduction of a single European currency, the Euro, in January 1999, there has been much interest in the area of Optimal and Common Currency areas. That it has worked relatively well over its first five years and is being well accepted has served to further this interest. The Euro's success aside, a number of external factors have led to renewed interest in Common Currency Areas (CCA). Globalization is one. As countries and governments grapple with the challenges of globalization, the idea of a common currency becomes more palatable.
Additionally, the frequency and the depth of recent currency crises have raised the question of whether maintaining individual national currencies and the attendant independent policies are worth the cost.
An Optimum Currency Area (OCA) and Common Currency Area (CCA) fall within the ambit of currency unions. An Optimum Currency Area (OCA), using Mundell's (1961) definition is "a domain within which exchange rates are fixed." By this definition, a CCA would be a step further with the adoption of a single common currency among members of the currency union. Several structural preconditions have been cited as being necessary for an OCA. Mundell (1961) argues that a high degree of factor mobility is an essential ingredient.
McKinnon (1963) , cites trade intensity or integration as a precondition. Kennen (1969) would examine regional production patterns for product diversification to determine if a region would be well suited for an OCA. Yet other literature on the configuration needed for a country to be a candidate of a currency union identify factors such as, similar levels of inflation, extensive trade relationships, similar or synchronous business cycles and a certain extent of policy congruence.
The processes that have to be in place and the convergence needed prior to launch of a CCA can be a long process. For Europe, the Euro's introduction was the culmination of a long evolutionary process towards single currency. The process itself is more than 50 years old and has its origins in the 1957 Treaty of Rome. The main markers of this evolution would be the establishment of the EMS in 1979, The Single European Act of 1986, the Maastricht treaty, 1991 and establishment of the European Central Bank (ECB) in 1998. That the movement towards a single European currency has been a long and arduous process should not be lost to aspirants of a CCA.
This paper explores the possibility of a currency union/CCA among two groups of MENA countries. The six GCC countries being the first group and the four Agadir countries, the second. The study is designed to address the following questions; (i) Is a currency union a feasible option for these two groups? (ii) What would the costs and benefits of such an arrangement be? and (iii) How would existing currency agreements / economic grouping fit into this? The paper is divided into five sections. Section two below lays out the contending issues with regards to implementing a CCA. Section three describes the data and methodology. The subsequent Section, discusses the findings and its implications. The final section, Section 5 concludes with recommendations for policy.
Section 2: CCA -The Key Contending Issues
Much has been researched and written on the impact and efficacy of a CCA arrangement on member countries. Broadly speaking, empirical evidence appears to show three key findings. First, there appears to be a large positive effect of currency unions on trade.
Rose (2000), using a gravity model which uses a dummy coefficient to indicate whether countries are using the same currency, shows that "bilateral trade between two countries that use the same currency is, controlling for other effects, 200% larger than bilateral trade between countries that use different currencies." 2 Other studies of the impact on trade produce similar results. Flandream and Maurel (2001), Lopez Cordova and Meissner (2001) and Frankel and Rose (2002) 3 all show increased trade of 220%, 100% and 290% respectively as a result of currency union.
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The second set of findings come from studies that examine the effect of reduced exchange rate volatility on trade. In contrast to what one would expect, Degrauwe and Skudelny (2000) , Frankel and Wei (1992) and Eichengren and Irwin (1995) 5 all find the effect 2 See Alesina et al (2002) 3 See Alesina et al (2002), Table 15, pg. 336 4 See: Bergsten and Park (2002) 5 See: Alesina et al (2002), pg. 335 of reduced exchange rate volatility on trade to be small. Finally, the third set of findings is that the border effects on trade are large. It appears that the necessity to use different currencies on both sides of a border and the transaction costs incurred as a result, acts to dampen trade. Agadir nations, would offset some of the attraction.
2.1: Costs and Benefits of a CCA
It is obvious that the immense undertaking that a CCA arrangement is, would involve numerous benefits and costs. Many of these would be direct and easily observable while others, less so. Some of the direct benefits would be (i) the elimination of exchange rate risk and greater predictability of relative prices for companies doing business within the CCA (ii) reduced transaction costs due to the elimination of bid-ask spreads on currency conversion and the hedging costs that would normally be incurred. (iii) the trade benefits of faster growth, enhanced competitiveness and efficiency (iv) enhanced cross-border investments and factor reallocation and (v) a final direct benefit comes from the 'enforced' policy commitment.
Though many of the benefits of a CCA could also accrue to normal fixed exchange rate / pegged systems, history has shown that fixed exchange rates are not irrevocably fixed.
Since a CCA arrangement is much more encompassing in terms of policy commitment and has deeper roots, the cost of breaking it is much higher than breaking a fixed exchange rate. This gives the CCA the credibility that a pegged system lacks. The result would be that a common currency would be less susceptible to monetary disturbance and speculative bubbles. Finally, since policy making, especially those of a monetary nature are detached and independent of individual governments, central banks and monetary authorities would be subject to less political pressure thereby leading to money supply and price stability. The fact that Europe has had less than 2% inflation over the last 10 years is no accident. 
2.2: Existing Currency/Economic Arrangements
In this section we examine the existing currency arrangements among our sample MENA Countries. Going by formal arrangements, there are really two subsets within our 10 sample countries. The four Agadir countries -Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan and the six GCC countries, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain and the UAE.
As early as 1945 while the US, Britain and the allied Nations were working out the Bretton Woods System, twenty two Arab nations got together to initiate a "Common Currency"
called "Arab Dinar". 7 Despite the early start, there appears to have been little progress until about 50+ years later when the GCC heads of state pushed for a fixed timetable for currency union among their six countries. Based on this plan, a common currency area could be in place among the six GCC nations by 2010 -i.e. some 65 years after the idea of an Arab common currency was first mooted. That a more broad based arrangement involving more than the six GCC countries has proved elusive, is testimony to the difficulties involved in managing the tradeoffs and the reality of economic disparities among the MENA countries. The fact that the MENA region has witnessed a series of wars since 1945 and is generally seen as one that is highly unstable has not helped. In such an environment, it is obvious that pushing for regional economic cooperation may have to be relegated to meet more pressing political crises. Yet, even here, a CCA arrangement could be a source of economic stability by ensuring policy credibility and cohesion.
Comparing the two subsets, the Agadir and GCC countries, one is quickly convinced of the stark contrast between these two groupings. The older of the two, the GCC was formally 
2.3: Exchange Rate Regimes
As with many MENA countries, exchange rate evolution in the Agadir countries have been one of fixed/managed systems, followed by serious overvaluation which in turn leads to crisis and devaluation followed by some liberalization. Egypt is a case in point. Though in 1991 as part of an IMF initiated reform program, Egypt had announced the adoption of a "managed float" for the Egyptian pound, the pound was essentially on a "conventional fixed peg" to the US$. 9 Following an overvaluation, serious current account deficit and balance of payments problems, and the attendant capital flight, the Egyptian government in January 2001, announced a devaluation of the pound and the adoption of a crawling peg against the US$.
Deteriorating economic conditions following the September 11, terrorist attacks, placed additional pressure. In January 2003, the government announced a "free float" of the pound.
Over the next few months, the pound depreciated sharply by about 33% against the US$.
The Jordanian Dinar appears to have gone through a similar pattern. Following a series of shocks due to overvaluation, the dinar was devalued 12% against the US$ and put on a "managed float". However, the dinar was subject to further deterioration and depreciation. . In order to ensure stable cross rates, the exchange rate integration required member currencies to be officially pegged to the US$. That the US$ was chosen as the "anchor" currency is not surprising given the fact that GCC currencies have been on a fixed peg to the US$ for a long time. Five of the six GCC currencies have been pegged to the US$. The exception being the Kuwaiti dinar, which was linked to a basket of currencies. Still, the US$ was prominently weighted within that basket. While the Omani and Saudi riyals have been pegged to the dollar since the 1970s and mid 1980s respectively, the Qatari, Bahraini and UAE currencies have been formally pegged to the US$. The idea of ensuring regional exchange rate stability by fixing regional currencies to a common anchor currency is built on the template of the European Monetary System (EMS), where a central grid was established by fixing member currencies to the ECU (European Currency Unit). As part of the move towards a Common Currency Area, the GCC countries have agreed on commitments prohibiting any unilateral changes to the pegged rate between their individual currencies and the US$. Attempts are currently under way on convergence by harmonizing growth rates, inflation / interest rates, and monetary and fiscal policies
Section 3: Data and Methodology
Since symmetry of economic activity has been identified as a key criterion in determining the feasibility of a CCA, our analysis is built on identifying "compatibility" among our two sample groups of countries. Since compatibility would imply some degree of synchronicity among key macroeconomic variables, we examine macroeconomic data.
Specifically, we examine annual data on real GDP growth, inflation 11 , money growth and short- 
where t e 1 and t e 2 are stochastic error terms called impulses or shocks in the language of VAR.
Both error terms have zero means, constant variances and are individually serially uncorrelated.
The structure of the system incorporates feedback because t y and t Z are allowed to affect each other. In Eq.
(1), current and past values of (y), affect the time path of (z). Eq. (2) allows for feedback between current and past values of (z) and (y). VAR essentially allows all variables to interact linearly with their own and each others current and past values. Thus, 16 See Hazel (2001) using historical data, one can determine the quantitative impact that each variable has on its own future value and the future values of the other variable(s).
Equations (1) and (2) For countries with clear aspiration to forming regional economic blocs, as Table 1 shows, there appears to be little correlation in growth rates. Among the GCC countries, we see only two meaningful linkages, between UAE and Bahrain and Saudi/Qatar. Among the Agadir countries there is not a single significant correlation in real output growth. If there is little linkage amongst the countries where real output is concerned, the picture is very different, especially for the GCC countries, where financial sector variables are concerned. Table 2 shows the correlation in inflation rates. Notice the numerous significant relationships. Even among the Agadir countries we see a few significant correlations, particularly in the case of Tunisia. The correlation in Money Growth shown in Table 3 
4.1: VAR Analysis; Impulse Response Functions
The Vector Autoregression Model shown as Eq. (4) was estimated for the two sets of countries. Using the estimated model, the impulse response functions and variance decomposition is examined using the natural log of Real GDP for WORLD and the 10 sample countries. Thus, two sets of VAR Analysis was carried out. The first with WORLD real GDP growth and GCC countries followed by another with WORLD Real GDP with that of the Agadir countries. The number of lags in the VAR is set to two lags. Since the ordering of variables is important, the ordering is done by ranking the countries by their GDP size. For both sets of analysis, the impulse response of individual countries is examined by "shocking" the WORLD Real GDP variable. As mentioned earlier, the objective is to examine how each country's real output responds to the same external shock. Symmetry, or countries with a similar response would suitable candidates for a common currency area. shows a response similar to that of Oman, though the initial negative impact is hardly visible.
The one non-symmetric response is that of UAE. The initial period response to the shock is positive. UAE's non symmetry is perhaps a reflection of its greater dependence on services and relatively lower reliance on oil exports alone. Thus, with the exception of the UAE, one could make the case that the first year (first period) impulse response are largely symmetric for the 5 GCC countries. Figure 2 shows the impulse response functions for the four Agadir countries. What is obvious is that unlike the case of the GCC countries, there is no symmetry whatsoever in this case. While there appears to be some resemblance in the response of Egypt and Jordan, they are really quite different in magnitude and duration. Thus, it appears that none of the Agadir countries respond similarly / symmetrically to the same external shock.
4.2: Variance Decomposition
Summary results of the variance decomposition for the two sets of countries, for four variance periods are shown in Tables 5 and 6 . In the context of our analysis, variance decomposition tells us the extent to which variance in the real output growth of each country is influenced by shocks to the common factor, WORLD GDP and by each of the other countries' real output. Examining the variance decomposition of the GCC countries in Table 6 , it is clear that none of the countries within the GCC have substantive influence on each other. The only case where we see some influence is in the case of Bahrain, both Saudi and the UAE appear to have some influence. In all other cases, no GCC member countries appears to have influence on real output growth in another. Not surprisingly, we see similar results for Agadir countries in Table 5 . The exception appears to be Jordan, where Tunisia has quite a substantive influence.
Section 5: Conclusion
This paper examined the feasibility of a CCA within two subsets of MENA countries, the GCC and Agadir group of countries. Feasibility is examined by analyzing the symmetry of response of countries within each group to a common external shock. In addition, the strength of linkages within each economic bloc was examined using Pearson pairwise correlation and variance decomposition. In other words, from a real GDP growth viewpoint, they are "independent" of each other but are connected / plugged in a similar way to global economic conditions. The fact that the GCC countries are all uniformly oil exporters to the rest of the world, but produce little non-oil products that are differentiated from each others, explains the results. Being producers of similar non-oil products, there simply isn't much avenue for intra-regional trade. Thus, the lack of influence of each country's shocks on other members. In a sense, the variance decomposition results reinforce our findings from the correlation analysis, which showed minimal linkage in the real sector. The lack of trade intensity or integration amongst GCC countries will represent a challenge to the desired implementation of a CCA by 2010.
Amongst the Agadir countries, we see no correlation in real output growth, some correlation where monetary variables are concerned, but no symmetry whatsoever in response to external shocks. The variance decomposition too did not show much mutual influence amongst countries within the group, where real GDP growth was concerned.
5.1: Implications
So what do these results imply about the potential for a CCA within the two groups of countries? The first implication of the results is that Monetary integration is much easier to achieve than trade / real sector integration. Yet, if the ultimate objective of a CCA is enhanced economic prosperity over the long term, then much needs to be done, even for the GCC which is now well advanced into a customs union. Where effort needs to be focused is on increasing intra regional trade. Intra-regional trade within GCC was a mere 3.5% in 1996. 21 The similarity in output appears to be the key deterrent. Thus, product diversification is necessary.
The reason increased regional trade is so critical to the long term success of a CCA is the fact that trade serves to synchronize business cycles; which in turn makes it possible for the use of common policies. In the absence of trade integration, the formation of a CCA would not only be hollow but also problematic. That a CCA will enable the use of common intra bloc policies independent of extra-regional influences will be meaningless and ineffectual if oil prices alone continue to dictate growth.
So, based on the results, one can only conclude that the GCC as it now stands is at best shown that a key sticking point will be the issue of how seigniorage which is lost by the individual country central banks, will be shared.
Much of the issues surrounding a CCA have serious economic implications. Since they typically also involve sovereignty and autonomy, may of the needed decisions are political in nature. Thus, political will and commitment will dictate the progress made towards a CCA. 
